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Spoliation of Evidence in Illinois:
The Law After Boyd v. Traveler'sInsurance Co.
HonorableMargaretO'MaraFrossard* & Neal S. Gainsberg*+
I.

INTRODUCTION

The doctrine of spoliation of evidence addresses the all too common
* Honorable Margaret O'Mara Frossard is a Judge of the Cook County Circuit Court
where she hears civil, felony, misdemeanor and traffic cases. She is a member of the
Illinois Judges' Association Publications Committee and is the author of the
association's Criminal Law Bench Book chapter on jury verdict impeachment. Judge
Frossard has written articles concerning criminal, civil and constitutional topics for
IICLE, Litigation Magazine, The Gavel, Chicago-Kent Law Review, the Northwest
Suburban Bar Association Journal, the North Suburban Bar Association Newsletter and
the National College of District Attorneys. For the past twelve years she has been an
Adjunct Professor of Law teaching Trial Advocacy at Northwestern University Law
School. She also teaches for the National Institute of Trial Advocacy in Boulder,
Colorado. Judge Frossard has lectured at programs sponsored by the CBA, NWSBA,
NSBA, IICLE, Illinois Judicial Conference, Cook County State's Attorney's Office and
National College of District Attorneys.
She is a member of the Circuit Court DUI Training and Education Subcommittee and
was Chairperson of the 2d District Planning Committee for the 1996 DUI Symposium.
She received her B.A. from Northwestern University and her J.D. from ITT/Chicago Kent
College of Law. Before becoming a judge, she was chief of the Felony Trial Division of
the Cook County State's Attorney's Office, supervising over 200 trial and appellate
lawyers.
Judge Frossard makes the following statement regarding this Article:
By no statement contained in these materials or in discussions related to
these materials do I intend to commit or appear to commit with respect to
cases, controversies, or issues within cases that are likely to come before me
in court.
I take great effort to make sure that each litigant who appears before me is
afforded every protection guaranteed by the Constitution. Our legal system is
based on the principle that an independent, fair, and competent judiciary will
interpret and apply the laws that govern us. As a member of the judiciary, I
would never prejudge a case nor would I commit or appear to commit with
respect to cases, controversies, or issues within cases that are likely to come
before me.
Judge Margaret O'Mara Frossard
* * B.A., 1993, University of Wisconsin-Madison, graduated with distinction; J.D.,
1996, Chicago-Kent College of Law, member Chicago-Kent Law Review, 1994-96,
Order of the Coif, graduated with High Honors. Mr. Gainsberg is currently in private
practice in Chicago, Illinois, where he is an associate at the law firm of E. Steven
Yonover. Mr. Gainsberg specializes in trial and appellate work in areas such as
plaintiff's personal injury law and federal and state criminal law.
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problem of the destruction of evidence vital to prospective or ongoing
litigation.' Without the evidence necessary to litigate a legal wrong, a
wronged or injured party appears to lose a legal remedy.' Accordingly,
an act of spoliation may deny a party evidence necessary to prosecute
or defend a lawsuit. 3 An act of spoliation of evidence increases the
likelihood that one party gains an unfair advantage in litigation. In
order to prevent an unjust result, courts have provided redress to
confront the problem of evidence destruction.
Several remedies have emerged to deter and punish the practice of
destroying evidence. These remedies include criminal penalties, 4
unfavorable evidentiary presumptions,- discovery sanctions, 6 and the
actual dismissal of lawsuits.7 These remedies, however, fail to
address the situation where a third party, not involved in the ongoing
litigation, destroys the evidence. Consequently, several jurisdictions,
including California and Florida, now recognize a new tort, spoliation
of evidence, which allows injured parties to recover against those who
intentionally or unintentionally, damage, lose, or destroy evidence
necessary for an injured party to prosecute its case. 8
1. Robert W. Thompson, To the Prevailing Party Goes the Spoils: An Overview of an
Emerging Tort in California, 18 W. ST. L. REV. 223, 225 (1990). Cases have dealt with
spoliation problems in all types of litigation since the nineteenth century. See, e.g.,
Fox v. Hale & Nocross Silver Mining Co., 41 P. 308, 322 (Cal. 1895) (referring to
spoliation of evidence as a "tortious act"). In criminal cases, prosecutors may violate a
defendant's constitutional and due process rights if they purposely destroy evidence
material to guilt or innocence. See Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 57 (1988). In
many cases, procedures for testing evidence often destroy the evidence and therefore
prevent one party from performing its own tests. See Melissa A. Bruzzano, Spoliation
of Evidence in California, 24 Sw. U. L. REV. 123, 138-42 (1994). As long as there is
litigation, courts will need to establish rules and procedures to address the spoliation of
evidence problem.
2. See Boyd v. Traveler's Ins. Co., 652 N.E.2d 267 (I11.1995); see also Smith v.
Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 829 (Ct. App. 1984); Bondu v. Gurvich, 473 So. 2d 1307
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
3. See American Family Ins. Co. v. Village Pontiac GMC, Inc., 585 N.E.2d 1115 (IlI.
App. 2d Dist. 1992).
4. See Alisa Thome-Cook, Note, Altered or Absent Evidence: The Tort of Spoliation:
Wilson v. Beloit Corp., 43 ARK. L. REV. 453, 464-66 (1990).
5. See infra Part IIl.A (discussing adverse influences or presumptions in jury
instructions).
6. See infra Part III.B (discussing various types of discovery sanctions).
7. See infra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
8. See Hazen v. Municipality of Anchorage, 718 P.2d 456 (Alaska 1986)
(recognizing intentional spoliation of evidence); Smith v. Superior Court, 198 Cal.
Rptr. 829 (Ct. App. 1984) (recognizing the tort of intentional spoliation of evidence);
Bondu v. Gurvich, 473 So. 2d 1307 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (recognizing the tort of
negligent spoliation of evidence); Coleman v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 905 P.2d 185 (N.M.
1995) (dismissing claim for negligent spoliation of evidence and upholding claim for
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Unlike courts in California and Florida, the Illinois Supreme Court
recently refused to recognize a tort of intentional or negligent spoliation
of evidence.9 Instead, the court held that an injured party may state a
cause of action under traditional common law negligence principles.
This Article will examine the various remedies that are available when
evidence has been damaged, lost, or destroyed. 0 These remedies will
be reviewed in light of their effectiveness in rectifying wrongs
committed through an act of spoliation of evidence.
First, this Article offers a background to the recurring problem of
spoliation of evidence."' Next, this Article discusses the traditional
remedies against a spoliator of evidence, as imposed by the courts of
Illinois and other jurisdictions.' 2 These remedies include a
presumption against a spoliator and discovery sanctions against a
spoliator. Then, this Article explores the tort of spoliation.' 3 In
exploring the tort of spoliation, this Article focuses on the development
of the tort,' 4 the elements of the tort, 15 the Illinois courts' response to
the tort,1 6 and the problems of duty and damages. 17 Finally, this
Article concludes that the traditional remedies against spoliators and8 the
tort of spoliation provide injured litigants with effective remedies 1
II. BACKGROUND: THE RECURRING PROBLEM OF
SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE

Spoliation, the act of damaging something, 9 occurs in everyday
life. Spoliation may occur because of the human temptation to gain an
advantage or to avoid responsibility. Simply, this type of conduct has
intentional spoliation of evidence); Smith v. Howard Johnson Co., 615 N.E.2d 1037
(Ohio 1993) (holding that a cause of action exists for interference with evidence);
Ortego v. Trevino, 938 S.W.2d 219 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997) (recognizing tort of
spoliation of evidence "in an appropriate factual setting"). See also infra Part IV
discussing the history and elements of the spoliation tort and explaining Illinois'
response to the tort of negligent spoliation of evidence.
9. See Boyd v. Traveler's Ins. Co., 652 N.E.2d 267 (III. 1995) (affirming dismissal
of claim for wanton and willful spoliation of evidence and reversing dismissal of
negligent spoliation of evidence claim stated under existing negligence law).
10. See infra Part III.
I 1. See infra Part 1I.
12. See infra Part III.
13. See infra Part IV.
14. See infra Part IV.A.
15. See infra Part IV.B.
1 6. See infra Part IV.C.
17. See infra Parts IV.D-E.
18. See infra Part V.
19.

WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY UNABRIDGED 2203

(1986).
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been called the act of intentional spoliation of evidence. In prospective
or ongoing litigation, the evidence damaged likely would harm or
threaten the spoliator. Therefore, in a lawsuit, spoliation of evidence
occurs when one party damages, loses, or destroys evidence. In many
instances, the obvious explanation for this type of action is that, with
the evidence available, the party accused of spoliation would not be
held liable or responsible for prior the conduct that resulted in the
lawsuit. On the other hand, a party seeking damages in a lawsuit may
destroy evidence to prevent the opposing party from presenting a valid
defense. The spoliation of evidence may undermine, if not prevent,
the prosecution or defense of a lawsuit.
Occasionally a spoliator of evidence will not be a party to the
litigation. A third party may destroy evidence central to litigation, even
though that party may have little or no connection to the litigation. In
this context, the third party often destroys evidence with no intention
of disrupting or preventing the underlying lawsuit. 20 Of course, the
spoliator's relationship to the underlying lawsuit does not always
explain the motive for the act of spoliation. Therefore, just as a third
party might intentionally destroy evidence to undermine an ongoing
lawsuit for any number of reasons, 2' a party to a litigation might
negligently destroy evidence as well.22
The sanctions for an act of spoliation vary. Traditionally, criminal
penalties have existed for acts of destroying evidence.23 In addition,
courts have either instructed juries to presume or infer bad conduct
24
from the act of spoliation in their deliberations, or they have imposed
discovery sanctions against the spoliator. 25 However, these types of
sanctions only benefit the non-spoliator if, first, evidence still
remained to prosecute or to defend the underlying lawsuit and, second,
a party to the lawsuit committed the acts of spoliation. Consequently,
jurisdictions have recently recognized acts of spoliation as distinct torts
which serve to expand the remedies available when evidence is
destroyed.
20. See Velasco v. Commercial Bldg. Maintenance Co., 215 Cal. Rptr. 504 (Ct. App.
1985) (plaintiff sued building maintenance crew for accidentally destroying evidence
while cleaning an attorney's office).
21. See Wilson v. Beloit Corp., 725 F. Supp. 1056 (W.D. Ark. 1989) (employer
alleged to have intentionally destroyed machine parts that an employee needed for a
products liability claim for injuries sustained during the course of employment), aff'd,
921 F.2d 765 (8th Cir. 1990).
22. See Boyd v. Traveler's Ins. Co., 652 N.E.2d 267, 269-70 (I11.1995).
23. See infra note 29.
24. See infra Part III.A.
25. See supra Part III.B.
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Underlying all these forms of sanctions is the problem of measuring
damages.26 After an act of spoliation has occurred, courts must be
careful to craft a balanced remedy to adequately punish the spoliator
and provide fairness to the lawsuit without giving the injured party a
large windfall. It is often speculative whether the act of spoliation
has any prejudicial effect on the non-spoliator. The destruction of
evidence that possibly may have been helpful to a party to the lawsuit
is not often reason alone for the courts to sanction the spoliator.
III. COURT-IMPOSED REMEDIES AGAINST A SPOLIATOR
Besides the tort of spoliation,28 courts have developed several
remedies to address the problem of spoliation. These remedies
include: (1) imposing criminal penalties against a spoliator; 29 (2) jury
instructions containing an adverse inference or adverse presumption
against the offending party;30 (3) preclusion of evidence as a discovery
sanction; 31 and (4) dismissal of the complaint as a discovery
sanction.32

26. See infra Part IV.E.2 (discussing the problem of quantifying damages).
27. See generally Thorne-Cook, supra note 4, at 473-75 (discussing the process of
proving damages in spoliation of evidence claims).
28. See infra Part IV (explaining the tort of spoliation of evidence).
29. See JAMIE S. GORELICK ETAL., DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE § 5.14, at 200-03 (1989)
(listing statutes that criminalize the destruction of evidence); see also 720 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 5/31-4(a) (West 1993) (criminalizing the destruction of evidence in a
pending criminal case).
30. When a party willfully or without reasonable excuse fails to produce evidence in
its control, Illinois courts use Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction ("I.P.I.") 5.01. ILLINOIS
PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, Civil, § 5.01 (West 1995). The jury is allowed to draw an
adverse inference or presumption against the party who failed to produce the evidence.
Instruction number 5.01 states:
If a party to this case has failed [to offer evidence] within his power to
produce, you may infer that the [evidence] would be adverse to that party if you
believe each of the following elements:
I. The [evidence] was under the control of the party and could have been
produced by the exercise of reasonable diligence.
2. The [evidence] was not equally available to an adverse party.
3. A reasonably prudent person under the same or similar circumstances would
have [offered the evidence] if he believed it favorable to him.
4. No reasonable excuse for the failure has been shown.
Id. (brackets in original).
3 1. See infra Part III.B.
32. See infra Part III.B.
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A. Adverse Inference or Presumption
Courts throughout the country have employed jury instructions to
remedy the dilemmas created by acts of spoliation.33 In the typical
case, the court instructs the jury to infer or to presume that the
destroyed evidence, were it available, would have helped the nonspoliator's case. 34 Through the adverse jury instruction, many courts
use the terms presumption and inference interchangeably. 35
Consequently, whether a court tells the jury to presume the destroyed
evidence negatively against the spoliator or to draw an adverse
inference against the spoliator makes little difference.36 For instance,
33. See GORELICK, supra note 29, at 55 nn.122-23; see also Beers v. Bayliner Marine
Corp., 675 A.2d 829, 832 (Conn. 1996) (in a civil context the majority of jurisdictions
employ the adverse jury instruction against the spoliator); Brown v. Hamid, 856 S.W.2d
51, 56-57 (Mo. 1993) (en banc) (describing Missouri's history of "an inference
unfavorable to the spoliator") (citations omitted); Fitzpatrick v. ACF Properties Group,
Inc., 595 N.E.2d 1327, 1334 (II1. App. 2d Dist. 1992) (Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction,
Civil, 5.01 (West 1995) "provides that a presumption arises that the evidence a party
fails to produce would be unfavorable to him").
34. See GORELICK, supra note 29, at 50. See also Bihun v. AT&T Info. Sys., Inc., 16
Cal. Rptr. 2d 787 (Ct. App. 1993), overruled in part on other grounds by Lakin v.
Watkins Indus., 863 P.2d 179 (Cal. 1993). In Bihun, the trial court employed the
following instruction to attempt to remedy the defendant's destruction of one of its
employee's personnel file:
If you find that defendant AT&T Information Systems, Inc. willfully
suppressed the personnel file of Peter Fellows, you may draw an inference that
there was something damaging to defendant's case contained in that personnel
file. Such an inference may be regarded by you as reflecting defendant's
recognition of the strength of plaintiff's case generally and/or the weakness
of its own case. The weight to be given such circumstance is a matter for your
determination.
Id. at 795. While this language went beyond the model language of the California
Evidentiary Codes, the appellate court acknowledged that this was a correct statement of
the law. Id. at 796.
Other jurisdictions have developed different forms of the adverse presumption or
inference instruction. See, e.g., Beers, 675 A.2d at 832-33 (Conn. 1996) (adverse
inference or presumption instruction appropriate only if: (1) act of spoliation was
intentional; (2) destroyed evidence is relevant to the issue upon which adverse inference
is sought; (3) non-spoliator acted with due diligence in obtaining the destroyed
evidence; and (4) jury is told it may apply the adverse inference at its discretion, but
only after finding that the three conditions were met); Watson v. Brazos Elec. Power Coop., 918 S.W.2d 639. 643 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996) (unfavorable presumption arises when
one party fails to produce evidence in its control to rebut harmful evidence from the
other side).
35. See May v. Moore, 424 So. 2d 596, 603 (Ala. 1982) (stating that "spoliation is a
sufficient foundation for an inference of. . . guilt or negligence").
36. Compare Watson, 918 S.W.2d at 643 (declaring that "spoliation presumption"
applies when spoliator fails to rebut harmful evidence introduced against it with
evidence it had in its control), with Beers, 675 A.2d at 832 (holding that court may
instruct jury to apply an "adverse inference" against spoliator), and Dileo v. Nugent,
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the Missouri Supreme Court labeled this negative jury instruction as
the "spoliation doctrine in evidence law," and the court stated that it
was based on the principle that "all things are presumed against a
wrongdoer. 3 7 The court then concluded that the instruction allows the
jury to draw an adverse inference against the spoliator.38
Courts impose this negative inference to both punish the spoliator
and to provide fundamental fairness to the underlying litigation. 39 The
majority of jurisdictions, therefore, will only give this instruction if
the spoliator intentionally destroyed the lost evidence. 40 These courts
reason that without this intentional act or some related act of bad faith,
the spoliator should simply not be held responsible for the lost
evidence.4
In Illinois, the decision whether to give the adverse presumption
jury instruction 42 on a party's failure to produce evidence at trial is left
to the discretion of the trial court.43 The failure to produce evidence
raises a presumption that the evidence, if produced, would have been
adverse to the party in control of that evidence. 44 The presumption
4
does not apply if the evidence is equally available to either party.

592 A.2d 1126, 1132 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991) (holding that "destruction of evidence
by a party gives rise to inferences or presumptions which are unfavorable to the
spoliator"), cert. granted, 599 A.2d 90 (Md. 1991).
37. Brown v. Hamid, 856 S.W.2d 51, 56 (Mo. 1993) (Missouri Supreme Court refused
to recognize a tort of spoliation on the facts presented to it).
38. See Brown, 856 S.W.2d at 57.
39. See GORELICK, supra note 29, § 1.12, at 16.
40. See Beers v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 675 A.2d 829, 832 (Conn. 1996) (citing
majority of jurisdictions that require intentional spoliation of evidence in order for a
court to apply an adverse jury instruction); see also Rodriguez v. Schutt, 896 P.2d 881,
884 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 914 P.2d
921 (Colo. 1996) (en banc). The Colorado Appellate Court in Rodriguez stated that
most courts will only give the adverse jury instruction if "the destruction of evidence
was intentional." Id. at 884. However, the court also recognized that in limited
circumstances, when a party unintentionally loses or destroys evidence, the adverse
instruction "may be appropriate even in the absence of bad faith, in order to remedy the
evidentiary imbalance created by the loss or destruction of evidence." Id.
41. See Beers, 675 A.2d at 833; see also Henderson v. Tyrrell, 910 P.2d 522, 533-35
(Wash. Ct. App. 1996) (concluding that without bad faith by the spoliator, there is no
real evidence that the act of spoliation was done to destroy adverse evidence against the
spoliator and thus the instruction is not necessary to address any wrong), amended by
1996 Wash. App. LEXIS 78 (Wash. Ct. App. March 14, 1996).
42. See I.P.I. No. 5.01.; see also supra note 30 and accompanying text.
43. See Roeseke v. Pryor, 504 N.E.2d 927, 933 (III. App. 1st Dist. 1987); Anderson
v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 498 N.E.2d 586, 598 (II1. App. 1st Dist. 1986). See
also I.P.I. § 5.01.
44. Berry v. Breed, 36 N.E.2d 591, 593-95 (111.App. 2d Dist. 1941).
45. Flynn v. Cusentino, 375 N.E.2d 433 (I11.App. 3d Dist. 1978).
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Furthermore, while trial court discretion determines when the
adverse presumption instruction will be given, one of two factors will
trigger the application of this discretion: (1) a lack of a reasonable
excuse for the nonproduction; or (2) a willful withholding of the
evidence, both as determined by the court.46 Similar to the majority
rule, Illinois courts generally give this type of instruction only if the
spoliator intentionally destroyed the evidence to gain an advantage.47
In Haynes v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,48 for instance, the plaintiffs
attorney lost a can of Coke that the plaintiff alleged contained the soft
drink that injured her. The appellate court reasoned that because the
evidence was accidentally lost, the trial court acted properly in not
instructing the jury about the negative inference instruction against the
spoliator.49
However, in a similar case involving lost evidence, the appellate
court reversed the trial court's dismissal of a complaint due to the
plaintiff's alleged spoliation. 50 In that case, Wakefield v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 5 1 the appellate court indicated that there was
insufficient evidence that the plaintiff deliberately disregarded the
court's order to produce the evidence. The case was remanded to the
trial court so that it could impose an appropriate sanction less drastic
than dismissal of the complaint, such as utilization of Illinois Pattern
Jury Instruction No. 5.012 on a failure to produce evidence. 3 This
case recognized jury instruction 5.01 as a possible remedy for
spoliation in situations where it is not necessarily deliberate.
While it is clear the adverse inference or presumption instruction is
the least severe of the remedies designed to address the spoliation
46. Coupon Redemption, Inc. v. Ramadan, 518 N.E.2d 285, 290 (11. App. Ist Dist
1987).
47. Fitzpatrick v. ACF Properties Group, 595 N.E.2d 1327, 1333 (111.App. Ist Dist.
1992); Haynes v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 350 N.E.2d 20, 26 (Il. App. Ist Dist. 1976).
In addition, before giving the adverse instruction, some courts require that the spoliator
intended both to destroy the evidence and to perpetuate a fraud. See Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Co. v. Jacobson, 827 F.2d 1119, 1134 (7th Cir. 1987); State v.
Langet, 283 N.W.2d 330, 333 (Iowa 1979). Other courts only look to whether the act of
spoliation itself was intentional. Beers v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 675 A.2d 829, 829
(Conn. 1996). Another approach crafts the jury instruction based on the intent or
motive of the spoliator. See Dileo v. Nugent, 592 A.2d 1126, 1126 (Md. 1991);
Henderson v. Tyrrell, 910 P.2d 522, 533 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996).
48. 350 N.E.2d 20, 26 (1976).
49. Id.
50. Wakefield v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 592 N.E.2d 539, 543-44 (11. App. Ist Dist
1992).
51. 59 N.E.2d 539, 543-44 (1992).
5 2. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
53. Id. at 543-44.
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problem, it is less clear when such instructions will actually be given.
Whether to give Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction No. 5.01 is a matter
within the sound discretion of the trial court.54 The factual
circumstances surrounding the failure to produce evidence, of course,
differ in each case.
Moreover, in the absence of a finding of willful withholding of the
evidence, the adverse presumption instruction may nonetheless be
applicable if a reasonable excuse for nonproduction is not offered.55
The Illinois Appellate court has very recently held that the mere fact
that defendants conducted a good faith search for records that were
inadvertently lost did not constitute a reasonable excuse for
nonproduction of the missing records.56
However, in several other cases, the trial court has refused to give
the instruction because the spoliator provided a reasonable excuse for
its failure to produce the destroyed or missing evidence. In Singh v.
Air Lines, Inc.,57 for instance, the record revealed a reasonable excuse
for failure to produce all of decedent's W-4 forms. Consequently, the
fact that the plaintiff could not locate these forms, and the fact that
54. See Roeseke v. Pryor, 504 N.E.2d 927, 927 (I11.App. 1st Dist. 1987); Anderson
v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 498 N.E.2d 586 (111.App. Ist Dist. 1986).
55. Bubrick v. Northern Illinois Gas, Co., 264 N.E.2d 560, 564-65 (I11. App. 1st
Dist. 1970) (court found that spoliator provided no reasonable explanation as to why
records that had not been destroyed in the ordinary course of business were not produced,
and that the lower court properly gave adverse inference instruction to jury).
56. Ivey v. Loyola Hosp., 1- 95-1657, Rule 23 Order (Ill. App. Ct. 1997). In that
case, the defendants could not find tally sheets for sponges used during a surgical
procedure of plaintiff where, as a result of the surgery, sponges were left in plaintiff's
abdomen. Id. The plaintiff did not have access to these tally sheets and was severely
prejudiced by the loss. Id. Therefore, although the defendant had no intent to destroy
the evidence, the claim that a search was conducted for the tally sheets was not a
reasonable excuse for their nonproduction. Id. See also Dugan v. Weber, 530 N.E.2d
1007, 1010 (III. App. 1st Dist. 1988) (holding that the mere loss of evidence does not
constitute a reasonable excuse for nonproduction); Roeseke v. Pryor, 504 N.E.2d 927,
932-33 (111. App. 1st Dist. 1987) (holding that although the defendant did not
intentionally destroy missing evidence, I.P.I. 5.01 was proper because the defendant
produced no excuse for its nonproduction). But see Chiricosta v. Winthrop-Breon, 635
N.E.2d 1019 (III. App. 1st Dist. 1994). In Chiricosta, the plaintiff appealed the trial
court's refusal to give the 5.01 jury instruction for the defendants' failure to produce
results of a blood gas test and transfer logs and log sheets. Id. at 1039. The appellate
court affirmed because the defendant had produced a reasonable excuse, which was that
the evidence was lost. Id. The court also noted that the lost evidence was incorporated
into other medical evidence and records which was produced to the plaintiff at trial. Id.
Finally, qualifying its decision, the court cautioned "that [its] holding is not one which
permits a party to avoid the impact of I.P.I. 5.01 by simply asserting that a record is
lost. Some records may be of such importance that it would be unreasonable to accept a
party's excuse that the records were lost." Id.
57. 520 N.E.2d 852, 859 (III. App. 1st Dist. 1988).
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these forms were available to both sides, proved that the trial court
correctly chose not to give the adverse presumption instruction.58 In
addition, in Laport v. Lake Michigan Management Co., 59 the
defendant provided a reasonable excuse for destroyed inspection
reports. 60 The reports were destroyed in the normal course of
business before the lawsuit was filed, and thus the trial court sin its
discretion properly refused to give the adverse presumption
instruction.I Clearly, what is determined to be a reasonable excuse
depends on the facts of each case.
The adverse inference or presumption jury instruction is most
helpful in cases where the lost evidence does not preclude a party from
proving some essential fact of its case.6 2 Through this type of negative
instruction, the court tells the jury to infer that the evidence would have
helped the party who wished to present it.63 In this way, the spoliator
can be held responsible for its conduct, and the fact-finder has a means
to weigh or to apply the destroyed evidence.'
One problem with the adverse inference remedy is the situation of
negligent destruction of evidence by a party to the litigation. Without
the intent to destroy or, in essence, the intent to undermine the pending
litigation, there seems no reason to provide a harsh punishment against
the spoliator, such as an adverse jury instruction. In this situation,
an adverse inference may provide an unfair windfall to the injured

58. Id. at 859.
59. 625 N.E.2d 1, 5 (II1. App. 1st Dist. 1991).
60. Id.at 5.
61. Id.; see also Myre v. Kroger Co., 530 N.E.2d 1122, 1125 (11. App. Ist Dist.
1988).
62. The evidence can be helpful to the plaintiff in proving its case to the jury, or the
evidence can help the defendant in either countering the plaintiffs case or establishing
an affirmative defense.
63. A party cannot use this presumption to prove an essential fact of its case, but a
party can use this to demonstrate that the spoliator did not want the evidence because the
evidence is harmful to the spoliator's case. See GORELICK, supra note 29, at 51-52.
64. When evidence is destroyed, the accuracy of the jury's decision will be affected.
However, the negative inference against the spoliator attempts to even the field.
65. See Haynes v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 350 N.E.2d 20, 26 (II1. App. ist Dist.
1976). Once again, the court distinguished between deliberate destruction and careless
mistake, and focused the jury upon the fact that the evidence was destroyed. Id. Here, the
jury may use this to infer that one party is guilty or acted inconsistent with its position
at trial, even though the party never intended to destroy the evidence. Id. at 26. More
importantly, the destroyed evidence may have little materiality to the underlying
proceeding, and it would be simply unfair to use the negligent destruction of this
evidence against the spoliator. Id.
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party based on mere speculation that potentially favorable evidence
was negligently destroyed.66
The negative inference or presumption does seem to work fairly
well where a party to the lawsuit intentionally destroys the evidence.
The jury is not only informed about the party's specific act of
spoliation, but the judge also highlights the seriousness of this fact by
allowing the jury to use it against the spoliator. As a result, the jury
can be expected to attempt to provide some remedy to the non-spoliator
in its decision.
The adverse jury instruction allows the jury not only to use the act
of spoliation to evaluate the evidence, but also to determine the effect
this spoliation act has on damages to the non-spoliator. For a
defendant to a lawsuit, a jury finding in its favor is all the
determination that is necessary for a just result. For a plaintiff in a
lawsuit, however, the jury could evaluate the materiality of destroyed
evidence and calculate damages in the context of the original action.68
Thus, at the same time the jury is using the lost evidence against the
defendant, it is also calculating the plaintiffs damages in light of both
the evidence it has and the fact that it does not have the destroyed
evidence.69
The adverse inference or presumption, however, provides no relief
where the spoliator is a third party. For instance, when a third party
destroys evidence, neither fairness nor punishment dictates an adverse
instruction. No equitable jury instruction can be crafted to help the
non-spoliator provide fairness to the underlying litigation and avoid
any punishment to the party not responsible for the act of spoliation.
Simply, in this case, the non-spoliator obtains too much of a benefit
against its innocent opponent. Therefore, the victim of spoliation has
to look beyond the underlying lawsuit to obtain a fair remedy.7°
66. Nevertheless, the non-spoliator should not be left without any remedy. In fact,
this party was not at fault for the destruction of evidence that may have helped it prove
its case. Hence, some courts have recognized negligent spoliation either as a separate
tort or used traditional common law principles to help the non-spoliator.
67. See Miller v. Montgomery County, 494 A.2d 761, 768 (Md. 1985).
68. See Boyd v. Traveler's Ins. Co., 652 N.E.2d 267, 271 (I11.1995); see also supra
notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
69. This type of damage calculation may require another jury instruction. To avoid
speculation as to how the lost evidence would prove up damages, while at the same time
allowing the jury to consider the act of spoliation, courts could tell juries or provide a
formula as to how the lost evidence affects monetary loss or some other form of
damages. In spoliation cases, the plaintiff's damages are often very difficult to calculate
and are not conducive to a neat formula. See infra Part IV.E.2 (discussing the problem of
quantifying damages).
70. See infra Part IV (discussing the tort of spoliation).

696

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 28

B. Discovery Sanctions
The act of spoliation may also constitute a violation of a discovery
rule or court order. Different jurisdictions have designed different
sanctions for violations of discovery rules or court orders ranging
from fines to dismissal of the lawsuit. 7' The act of spoliation may be
intentional, negligent, or accidental. Nevertheless, where discovery
rules or court orders are violated or disregarded, courts will not
hesitate to impose sanctions. Part of the justification for a discovery
sanction is simply to enforce court rules. 72 When a party damages,
loses, or destroys evidence in clear violation of the discovery rules or
court orders, it should not only be punished for the acts of spoliation
but for the violations of the discovery rules and court orders as well.
Furthermore, the type of discovery sanction typically mirrors the
culpability of the spoliator.73 Courts can impose monetary sanctions to
attempt to remedy the spoliation problem. This type of fine works best
when the destroyed evidence has minor relevance in the underlying
litigation and when the lawsuit can continue despite the act of
spoliation.
However, monetary fines, notwithstanding the amount, may not
effectively deter or prevent spoliation when the destroyed evidence
relates to a number of issues in the case. In an economic analysis, the
benefit of the act of spoliation may outweigh any potential discovery
fines, thereby rendering any fine meaningless. 74 Moreover, the nonspoliator, who loses access to valuable evidence and possible
remedies, does not seem to obtain any fairness when the spoliator
must simply pay a monetary fine to the court.
Consequently, courts can impose punitive discovery sanctions, such
as barring a party from presenting evidence on an issue or dismissing
7 1. See e.g., Graves v. Daley, 526 N.E.2d 679 (I11.App. 3d Dist. 1988) (plaintiff's
intentional destruction of evidence violated discovery rules and warranted dismissal of
the lawsuit). Illinois Supreme Court Rule 219(c) lists several sanctions that a trial court
may impose for a party's failure to comply with discovery rules, such as barring the
filing of pleadings (ii), barring any witness from testifying (iv), and dismissal of all or
parts of a lawsuit (vi). 73 11. 2d R.219(c). This newly amended rule also adds to the list
of sanctions a trial court may impose a monetary penalty against a party or against that
party's attorney as a result of the willful violation of the discovery rules, and the rule
gives the trial court greater discretion to fashion an appropriate sanction against a party
who has violated the discovery rules or orders. Id.
72. See generally Ralston v. Casanova, 473 N.E.2d 444 (Iil. App. 1st Dist. 1984)
(court looked to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 219(c) and found that lower court did not
abuse its discretion in barring plaintiff's testimony regarding condition of seat belt as
discovery sanction for expert's destructive testing of seat belt in violation of protective
orders preserving belt in its present condition).
73. See GORELICK, supra note 29, at 94.
74. Id.
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the lawsuit, to remedy acts of spoliation. Courts will usually impose
this type of discovery sanction if the destroyed evidence relates to a
number of critical issues in the case and the non-spoliator has been
prejudiced.76
In general, Illinois courts focus upon the prejudice to the nonspoliator before imposing discovery sanctions.77 In Illinois, a trial
court is not required to find that a party intentionally destroyed
evidence in order to bar testimony regarding that evidence.78 The
nature of the spoliation, whether intentional, negligent, or accidental,
is of little importance to the analysis of whether sanctions should be
imposed where prejudice is found. 79 Likewise, for cases using the
prejudice standard, the point of time at which the act of spoliation
occurred, and whether the evidence was damaged, destroyed, or lost
75. See Rodgers v. St. Mary's Hosp., 597 N.E.2d 616, 619 (I11. 1992) (Illinois
statute imposes a duty on hospitals to preserve X-rays and other roentgen film for at
least five years); see also X-ray Retention Act, 210 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 90/1 (West
Supp. 1996). Other jurisdictions have similar X-ray retention acts. See, e.g., R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 23-4.9-1 (1996).
76. Pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 219(c), Illinois courts have dismissed
plaintiffs' lawsuits because of discovery violations. See, e.g., Ralston v. Casanova,
473 N.E.2d 444 (111.App. 1st. Dist 1984) (holding that evidence of plaintiff's expert's
test was not produced and therefore expert was prevented from testifying and summary
judgment was granted); In re Estate of Soderholm, 469 N.E.2d 410 (II1. App. 1st Dist.
1984) (holding that because the plaintiff failed to produce evidence which was in its
control, default judgment was proper); Stegmiller v. H.P.E., Inc., 401 N.E.2d 1156 (I11.
App. Ist Dist. 1980) (holding dismissal appropriate because plaintiff was unable to
comply with a production request and court order regarding evidence in its control).
77. See Shelbyville Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sunbeam Leisure Prods., 634 N.E.2d 1319 (I11.
App. 5th Dist. 1994). In Shelbyville Mutual, a grill exploded, causing injuries to the
plaintiff. Id. at 1321. The plaintiff's investigators took parts of the grill for testing
and unintentionally lost them. Id. at 1321-22. The trial court then barred plaintiff from
presenting any evidence regarding the lost grill parts and thus granted summary
judgment. Id. at 1322. The appellate court affirmed, reasoning that the destruction of
evidence greatly prejudiced the defendant's ability to present a defense and justified
dismissal of the lawsuit. Id. at 1322-23. As a result, the trial court properly barred the
plaintiff from presenting any evidence on the lost grill parts and entered summary
judgment. Id. at 1323. See also Shimanovsky v. General Motors Corp., 648 N.E.2d 91
(111.App. Ist Dist. 1994), leave to appeal granted, 1996 (holding that trial court erred in
failing to hold a hearing to determine prejudice sustained by non-spoliator).
78. See Argueta v. Baltimore & Ohio Chicago Terminal R.R. Co., 586 N.E.2d 386
(111.App. 1st Dist. 1992). In this case, the trial court refused to admit the defendant's
expert report into evidence. Id. at 392. The report contained test results on a piece of
evidence that the defendant subsequently destroyed. Id. at 393. The court reasoned that
the prejudicial effect of this destruction of evidence to the plaintiffs case outweighed the
fact that defendant inadvertently destroyed the evidence. Id.
79. See Stegmiller, 401 N.E.2d at 1156. In Stegmiller, the evidence was not
intentionally destroyed. Id. at 1157. However, the court found prejudice against the
non-spoliator defendant. Id. at 1158. Therefore, the plaintiff's violation of discovery
requests and a court order triggered the sanction of lawsuit dismissal. Id.
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before or after the suit was filed, is of little importance to the decision
to impose sanctions."0
In analyzing the nature of the prejudice, Illinois courts have found it
helpful to focus on the type of evidence destroyed and how important
that evidence would have been to the innocent party. Consequently,
Illinois courts fashion discovery sanctions by examining both the type
of evidence destroyed and the type of prejudice the non-spoliator
sustained. 8 In Farley Metals, Inc. v. Barber Coleman Co.,82 the trial
court entered a protective order, requiring that no party conduct
destructive testing or alter physical evidence from an explosion.83 The
plaintiff inadvertently destroyed the evidence, and the trial court
dismissed the lawsuit pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule
2 19(c). 84 Recognizing that Illinois courts look at the type of prejudice
the spoliation act causes in crafting discovery sanctions, the appellate
court rejected the plaintiff's argument that its lack of intent to destroy
required a less harsh sanction." The court noted that "[a] showing
that plaintiff's noncompliance [with discovery rules] was reasonable
does not hinge on intent; the critical issue is how important the
undisclosed material was to the opposing party." 86
Some courts relax or lessen the prejudice standard when the
spoliation is in violation of a court order. In Jones v. Goodyear Tire
& Rubber Co.,8 7 the trial court granted the plaintiff's motion for a
80. See Graves v. Daley, 526 N.E.2d 679, 681-82 (111.
App. 3d Dist. 1988). In
Graves, the plaintiff sued the manufacturer of a furnace for damages caused in a fire. Id. at
680-81. During the discovery process, the manufacturer sought to inspect the furnace,
but the plaintiff was unable to produce the evidence, which had been disposed of at the
request of the plaintiffs insurer. Id. Because the plaintiff was unable to produce the
evidence, the trial court issued discovery sanctions. Id. Specifically, the trial court
barred "any evidence regarding the condition of the furnace." Id. The appellate court
upheld the decision and consequently granted summary judgment. Id. at 682.
81. See, e.g., Jones v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 137 F.R.D. 657 (C.D. Ill. 1991)
(court held that amount of prejudice plaintiff must demonstrate was related to whether
spoliator destroyed evidence in violation of protective order), aff'd sub nom. Marrocco
v. General Motors Corp., 966 F.2d 220 (7th Cir. 1992); Farley Metals, Inc. v. Barber
Coleman Co., 645 N.E.2d 964, 966 (11. App. 1st Dist. 1994) (court looked at prejudice
resulting from inadvertent destruction of evidence).
82. 645 N.E.2d 964, 966 (111.
App. Ist Dist. 1994).
83. Id. at 966.
84. Id. at 967.
85. ld. at 968.
86. Id.; see also Graves v. Daley, 526 N.E.2d 679 (I11.
App. 3d Dist. 1988). In this
case, the nature of the spoliation, i.e. intentional or willful destruction, may have had an
impact on the court's decision to dismiss the action even though the evidence was
destroyed five months before the lawsuit. Id. at 681-82.
87. 137 F.R.D. 657 (C.D. Il1. 1991), affirmed sub nom.Marrocco v. General Motors
Corp., 966 F.2d 220 (7th Cir. 1992).
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directed verdict against Goodyear for an act of spoliation.8 8 The court
noted that the amount of prejudice that must be shown may vary
depending upon whether the destruction of evidence is in violation of a
protective order.
However, a number of Illinois cases have additionally held that the
prejudice from an act of spoliation and a discovery violation did not
warrant a harsh sanction, such as a default judgment or the barring of
evidence. Once again, these Illinois cases focus on the type of
prejudice the act of spoliation of evidence causes. 89
Finally, some Illinois courts are imposing a duty on parties to
preserve evidence, especially if they want to bring a lawsuit. The
cases suggest that a party must preserve evidence when it knows or
should have known that other parties would want to inspect the
evidence. In these cases, courts have held that insurance companies
have a duty, which predates the filing of a complaint, to preserve a
product that is the basis of a product liability action the subrogating
insurance company intends to file. 9°
Similarly, jurisdictions outside of Illinois have focused on the
"duty" analysis when approaching a spoliation issue. 91 The
Massachusetts Supreme Court noted a public policy rationale to
8 8. Id. at 664.
89. See Thomas v. Bombardier-Rotax Motorenfabrik, GmbH, 869 F. Supp. 551, 554
(N.D. Ill. 1994); H&H Sand & Gravel Haulers Co. v. Coyne Cylinder Co., 632 N.E.2d
697, 702 (111.App. 2d Dist. 1994).
Jurisdictions outside of Illinois have also focused on the prejudice sustained by the
non-spoliator as the test for imposing sanctions. See, e.g., Dillon v. Nissan Motor
Co., Ltd., 986 F.2d 263, 267 (8th Cir. 1993); Puritan Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 217
Cal. Rptr. 602, 608 (Ct. App. 1985) (barring the testimony of an expert because the
expert misplaced the evidence and thus prevented the other side from testing the
evidence); Patton v. Newmar Corp., 538 N.W.2d 116, 119 (Minn. 1995); Hirsch v.
General Motors Corp., 628 A.2d 1108, 1128 (N.J. Super. 1993) (also recognizing that
the intent of the spoliator is important in crafting the discovery sanction).
Similarly, jurisdictions outside of Illinois have focused on the intent of the spoliator
and factor prejudice and the intent of the spoliator into their analysis. St. Mary's Hosp.
v. Brinson, 685 So. 2d 33, 35 (Fla. App. Ct. 1996) (focusing on the spoliator's
intentional disobedience of the court order); Fire Ins. Exchange v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
747 P.2d 911, 914 (Nev. 1987).
90. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Sunbeam Corp., 53 F.3d 804 (7th Cir. 1995)
(recognizing the duty of an insurance company to preserve evidence); State Farm Fire &
Casualty Co. v. Frigidaire, 146 F.R.D. 160, 162 (N.D. I11. 1992) (in product liability
case court imposed sanctions on plaintiff for failing to preserve evidence because "a
plaintiff is obligated . . . to preserve the allegedly defective product which it knew, or
reasonably should have known, would be material in the contemplated . . . action");
American Family Ins. Co. v. Village Pontiac GMC, Inc., 585 N.E.2d 1115, 1118-19
(I1l. App. 2d Dist. 1992) (focusing on the fact that "in anticipation of a subrogation
claim [the insurance company] allowed the car to be destroyed").
91. Nally v. Volkswagon of America, Inc., 539 N.E.2d 1017, 1021 (Mass. 1989).
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consider when resolving questions of spoliation, stating that as a
matter of sound public policy, an expert should not be permitted
destroy evidence and then substitute his
intentionally or negligently to
92
or her own description of it.
Regardless of which standard is applied, courts have not been timid
in entering judgments against parties when their acts of spoliation
violate discovery rules or court orders. 93 Without any prejudice, the
non-spoliator has not sustained any type of injury that requires a
drastic sanction, such as evidence exclusion or case dismissal. In such
circumstances, a monetary fine may be sufficient. 94 If, however, the
spoliator is a third party, then the usual sanctions ranging from fines to
dismissal may fail to provide relief to the non-spoliator. 95
IV. THE SPOLIATION TORT

A. The History of the Tort
In the past fifteen years, many jurisdictions have expanded the
available remedies for an act of spoliation to include a separate tort of
spoliation. In light of the spoliation tort, individuals injured through
an act of spoliation are now able to bring a lawsuit against the spoliator
and recover monetary damages. In addition, courts have distinguished
between intentional and negligent spoliation and thus have created and
discussed the creation of two separate torts.
California first recognized the tort of spoliation in Smith v. Superior
96
Court.
In that case, a part of a van sold by the defendant fell off the
van and blinded the plaintiff in a car accident.9 7 The defendant took
control of the van after the accident and promised to preserve it as
evidence. He ultimately lost the evidence. The plaintiffs lawsuit

92. Id.
93. As in Illinois cases, many courts also look to the relevance of the destroyed
evidence. If the evidence relates to contested issues in the lawsuit, the dismissal of
complaints and default judgments will be entered against the plaintiff. See Whitewater
Valley Canoe Rental, Inc. v. Board of Franklin County Comm'rs, 507 N.E.2d 1001,
1007 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987); Merck & Co. v. Biorganic Labs., Inc., 196 A.2d 688, 690
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1964).
94. See Iowa Ham Canning, Inc. v. Handtmann, Inc., 870 F. Supp 238, 244 (N.D. I11.
1994) (defendants failed to establish prejudice because it produced no expert testimony
concerning its need for the destroyed evidence).
95. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
96. 198 Cal. Rptr. 829 (Ct. App. 1984).
97. Id. at 831.
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against the defendant thus included counts for negligent and intentional
spoliation of evidence.9 8

Relying on the basic principle that where there is a wrong there is a
remedy, the California appeals court established the tort of intentional
spoliation of evidence. 99 The court recognized that the extent and
amount of damages in a spoliation case is highly speculative.00
Furthermore, the court noted that the plaintiff alleging spoliation would
have difficulty demonstrating the effect the destroyed evidence would
have had on the underlying lawsuit.'0 ' Nevertheless, the appellate
court reasoned that the spoliation plaintiff must only allege a
"reasonable probability" that, but for the destruction of the evidence, it
would have successfully defended or prosecuted its lawsuit. 102
Additionally, the California Supreme Court established the tort of
negligent spoliation of evidence.'0 3 In Williams v. State, °4 a police
officer investigated the scene of a car accident and took control of the
critical evidence that allegedly caused the accident.'0 5 The police
department, however, failed to preserve this evidence. The plaintiff
then sued the police department because of its inability to bring a
product liability lawsuit based on the destroyed evidence. The court
held that because the officer voluntarily assumed responsibility of the
care and maintenance of the evidence, the police department had a duty
to preserve the evidence." °
98. Id.
99. Id. at 837.
100. See infra notes 216-19 and accompanying text (discussing quantifying
damages).
101. If the destroyed evidence is the only evidence available to a plaintiff to
establish a prima facie case, then damages will be easier to prove. However, if the
destroyed evidence simply constitutes one aspect of many pieces of evidence, then a
plaintiff will have a harder time demonstrating actual damages. See Boyd v. Traveler's
Ins. Co., 652 N.E.2d 267, 273 (I11. 1995). In this context, the amount of damages, if
any, relates to the type of prejudice the non-spoliator sustained. See H&H Sand &
Gravel Haulers Co. v. Coyne Cylinder Co., 632 N.E.2d 697, 703 (111.App. 2d Dist.
1994) (holding that discovery sanctions against plaintiff for act of spoliation were not
proper because defendant sustained no prejudice).
102. The model jury instruction for California provides for an intentional spoliation
instruction. See California Jury Instruction BAJI 7.95 (8th ed., West 1994) (laying out
the six elements required to establish intentional spoliation of evidence).
103. Williams v. State, 664 P.2d 137 (Cal. 1983). California also provides a jury
instruction for negligent destruction of evidence. See California Jury Instruction 7.96
(8th ed., West 1993) (listing the seven elements of the negligent spoliation of
evidence).
104. 664 P.2d 137 (Cal. 1983).
105. Id. at 138.
106. Id. at 143.
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As in any other negligence action, the plaintiff must establish that
the defendant had some duty to preserve the evidence. The court
suggested that the mere negligence act of spoliation is not sufficient to
establish the cause of action. Rather, for this tort, the spoliator must
owe a duty to preserve evidence and breach this duty."°7
Following California's lead, other jurisdictions established the tort
of spoliation. Alaska recognized "the common cause of action in tort
for intentional interference with prospective civil actions by spoliation
of evidence."10 8 Similarly, Florida recognized common law torts for
both intentional and negligent spoliation of evidence.' 0 9 The Florida
Appellate Court reasoned that this cause of action was based on
general public policy considerations, such as remedying the nonspoliator's "loss of an opportunity to litigate." 1 0
Other jurisdictions, however, have rejected the spoliation of
evidence tort.' For instance, the Connecticut Supreme Court recently
held that the adverse jury instruction was the most appropriate remedy
for a spoliation of evidence claim, and, consequently, the court did not
recognize an action for spoliation of evidence.' 12 Similarly, a
107. Id.
108. See Hazen v. Municipality of Anchorage, 718 P.2d 456, 463 (Ala. 1986). The
Alaska Supreme Court adopted the reasoning of Smith v. Superior Court in establishing
the tort of intentional spoliation of evidence. Id. (citing Smith v. Superior Court, 198
Cal. Rptr. 829 (Ct. App. 1984)). The Alaska Supreme Court did not recognize the tort of
negligent spoliation of evidence. Id.
109. See generally Miller v. Allstate, 573 So. 2d 24, 26 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990)
(recognizing cause of action in contract for spoliation of evidence); Bondu v. Gurvich,
473 So. 2d 1307 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (recognizing tort of negligent spoliation).
110. See Continental Ins. Co. v. Herman, 576 So. 2d 313, 315 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1990). Courts in Ohio have also recognized the tort of intentional spoliation of
evidence. See Smith v. Howard Johnson Co., 615 N.E.2d 1037, 1038 (Ohio 1993)
(affirmatively answering that Ohio will recognize a cause of action in tort for
interference with or destruction of evidence).
I1 l. See, e.g., Brown v. Hamid, 856 S.W.2d 51, 56-57 (Mo. 1993) (refusing to
recognize torts of intentional and negligent spoliation of evidence on the facts
presented).
1I12. See Beers v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 675 A.2d 829, 832 (Conn. 1996); see also
Brewer v. Dowling, 862 S.W.2d 156, 159-60 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993) (declaring that an
adverse jury instruction, rather than a spoliation tort, was the just remedy). A recent
Texas Appellate Court, however, recently recognized that Texas law supports a
spoliation tort. See Ortego v. Trevino, 938 S.W.2d 219 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997). The
Texas court concluded that the adverse jury instruction did not provide a "sufficient
deterrent" to the spoliator and that "fundamental principles of justice" demanded the
recognition of a spoliation tort.
In 1972, the Connecticut Supreme Court discussed a jury instruction regarding the
failure of a party to produce a witness:
The failure of a party to produce a witness who is within his power to produce
and who would naturally have been produced by him, permits the inference that
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Maryland appeals court rejected the spoliation tort, declaring that the
negative inference jury instruction provided an adequate remedy to the
non-spoliator." 3 Moreover, courts in Missouri, Michigan, and
Arizona refused to create spoliation torts under the facts of the cases
presented to them." 4 Refusing to recognize a new tort of spoliation,
the Arizona Supreme Court held that common law tort principles
already provided an available remedy to plaintiff's intentional
spoliation tort claim." 5 These jurisdictions saw no need to expand on
the traditional remedies or existing law to redress spoliation acts.
In addition, in Coleman v. Eddy Potash, Inc.,"1 6 the New Mexico
Supreme Court recognized a cause of action for intentional spoliation
of evidence, but in the same case refused to recognize a negligent
spoliation cause of action.'" According to the Coleman court,
"generally speaking, liability for interference with prospective
economic interests has been limited to cases of intentional
interference. ' 18 Moreover, the court stated that creation of this new
negligence tort would impose unnecessary duties on individuals to
preserve evidence.' 9 However, the court noted that a duty to preserve
evidence for litigation may arise from traditional principles of
the evidence of the witness would be unfavorable to the party's cause. The
party against whose cause an unfavorable inference is claimed, may, of course,
offer evidence to explain the failure to produce the witness. There are two
requirements for the operation of the rule: (I) The witness must be available;
(2) he must be a witness whom the party would naturally produce.
Secondino v. New Haven Gas Co., 165 A.2d 598, 600 (Conn. 1972) (citing Ezzo v.
Geremiah, 142 A. 461, 464). See also Rosalyn B. Bell, Maryland Jury Instructions and
Commentary § 4.19 (1993). The Maryland instruction reads:
In this case,...
(name of party) testified that [he or she]
destroyed
(whatever was destroyed). The destruction of evidence by a
party gives rise to an inference which is unfavorable to the destroyer. That
inference depends upon the intent of the party responsible for the destruction.
Unexplained and intentional destruction of evidence by a party gives rise to an
inference that the evidence would be unfavorable, but does not amount to proof
that the evidence was unfavorable.
[If you find that
(name of party) fraudulently tampered with or destroyed
evidence, or intimidated the other side's witnesses, then you may also infer
that
(name of party) believes that [his or her] case is weak.]
113. See Miller v. Montgomery County, 494 A.2d 761, 768 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1985).
1 14. See, e.g., La Raia v. Superior Court, 722 P.2d 286, 290 (Ariz. 1986); Panich v.
Iron Wood Prods. Corp, 445 N.W.2d 795, 798 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989); Brown v. Hamid,
856 S.W.2d 51, 56-57 (Mo. 1993).
1 15. La Raia, 722 P.2d at 290.
116. 905 P.2d 185 (N.M. 1995).
117. See id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
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negligence. 20 The court suggested that a new tort of negligent
spoliation of evidence would be too expansive and impose an
unreasonable
duty on property owners to maintain their personal
2
property.' '
B. The Elements of the Tort of Spoliation of Evidence
Courts have established both the elements of intentional and
negligent spoliation. Because parties often allege both acts of
spoliation in their lawsuits, some courts have merged spoliation into
one tort. 22 The majority of courts attempt to separate the negligent act
from the intentional act of spoliation.'23
1. Intentional Spoliation
While on its face intentional spoliation of evidence may seem the
easier tort to define, courts have been unclear in establishing its
elements. 24 Nevertheless, one commentator has delineated the
following elements: (1) pending or probable litigation; (2) defendant's
knowledge of the existence or likelihood of litigation; (3) an intentional
act to destroy evidence and undermine the plaintiffs case; (4) actual
disruption of the plaintiffs case; and (5) damages proximately caused
by the act of spoliation. 25 Recently, the New Mexico Supreme Court
120. Id. at 190-9 1. The court indicated that, under traditional negligence principles,
"special circumstances" may impose a duty to preserve evidence, such as an agreement,
statute, or other circumstances. Id. The Illinois Supreme Court has recently adopted a
similar approach in Boyd v. Traveler's Ins., 652 N.E.2d 267 (i11.
1995) (holding that a
claim for negligent spoliation could be stated under existing tort law). See infra Part
IV.C discussing Boyd.
12 I. Coleman, 905 P.2d at 190.
122. See Falvaloro v. Golden Gate, 687 F. Supp 475, 481 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
123. See, e.g., Coleman, 905 P.2d at 189 (holding that a cause of action exists for
intentional spoliation, but not for negligent spoliation). California has separate jury
instructions for both torts. See California Jury Instruction BAI 7.95 (8th ed., West
1994) (intentional spoliation of evidence) and BAJI 796 (negligent spoliation of
evidence).
124. See Bruzzano, supra note 1,at 129.
125. Comment, Spoliation: Civil Liabilityfor Destruction of Evidence, 20 U. RICH.
L. REV. 191, 200-01 (1985). The California Model Jury Instructions list the following
elements for an intentional spoliation of evidence claim:
1. Plaintiff possessed "potential" claim or defense for a lawsuit;
2. Defendant knew of the existence of this claim or defense;
3. Defendant knew of the existence of evidence and was aware that it might
constitute evidence in pending or potential civil litigation involving
plaintiff;
4. Defendant engaged in acts or conduct intended to cause the destruction,
damage, loss, or concealment of the evidence;
5. Defendant's act caused the damage or concealment of the evidence;
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articulated these same elements when it recognized a cause of action
for intentional spoliation of evidence. 26 .
These elements highlight the uncertainty of establishing damages in
this type of cause of action. A non-spoliator's injury can range from
the inconvenience of obtaining alternative evidence to the actual
preclusion of proving an element of its prima facie case. Courts have
refrained from identifying in specific terms the type of damages that a
plaintiff must plead and prove to prevail. 27
2. Negligent Spoliation of Evidence
A Florida appellate court set forth the following elements for a prima
facie case of negligent spoliation of evidence:1 28 (1) existence of a
potential civil action; (2) a legal or contractual duty to preserve
evidence that is relevant to the potential civil action; (3) destruction of
that evidence; (4) a causal relationship between the evidence and
29
destruction and the inability to prove the lawsuit; and (5) damages.
The difficult concept with the negligent cause of action is the
concept of duty.130 Courts do not want to impose unreasonable
burdens on individuals or parties to preserve and to maintain

6.

As a result, Plaintiff sustained damage, namely Plaintiff's opportunity to
prove its claim or defense was interfered with substantially.
California Jury Instructions BAJI 7.95 (8th ed., West 1994).
126. See Coleman v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 905 P.2d 185, 190 (N.M. 1995).
127. Id. (discussing the required allegations to state a cause of action); see also Smith
v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 829, 836 (Ct. App. 1984) (recognizing the tort of
spoliation and reciting the required elements).
128. See Continental Ins. Co. v. Herman, 576 So. 2d 313, 315 (Fla. Ct. App. 1990).
129. Id. In addition, The Model California Jury instructions, BAJI No. 7.96, list the
following elements for a negligence cause of action:
1. Plaintiff possessed a defense or claim for damages against defendant, third
party;
2. Defendant knew or reasonably should have known of this potential defense
or claim for damages;
3. Defendant knew or reasonably should have known of the existence of the
destroyed evidence and knew or reasonably should have known that it
might constitute evidence in pending or potential litigation involving
Plaintiff or other person;
4. Defendant knew or reasonably should have known that [he/she/it] did not
act with reasonable care to preserve the evidence;
5. Defendant's failure to act with reasonable care caused the destruction,
damage to, loss or concealment of such evidence;
6. As a result, Plaintiff sustained damage, namely Plaintiffs opportunity to
prove its claim or defense was interfered with substantially.
BAJI No. 7.96.
130. See infra notes 167-87 and accompanying text.
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evidence. 3 ' Nevertheless, a Florida appeals court has recognized a
limited duty on doctors to preserve medical records based on Florida
statutes and administrative rules.'32 In addition, a federal district court
in the eastern district of Pennsylvania held that there was a duty of
reasonable care to preserve evidence when the defendant's employee, a
claims adjustor, voluntarily assumed custody of the evidence.'3 3 The
a workmen's
claims adjustor was
34 investigating an accident in
case.
compensation
Like the New Mexico Supreme Court's recent decision in Coleman,
however, these cases suggest that there must be some special
circumstance upon which to establish the duty to preserve evidence.
Instead of "recognizing" new negligence torts, these courts may be
able to rely on traditional common law negligence principles to support
the spoliation cause of action. One commentator has suggested that,
while California courts have stated that a separate tort for negligent
spoliation of evidence exists, these courts essentially have created
"another [common law] theory upon which a negligence cause of
' 35
action may be stated."'
C. Boyd v. Traveler's Insurance:
Illinois' Answer to the Negligent Spoliation Tort
The Illinois Supreme Court recently refused to recognize the distinct
tort of spoliation of evidence. As have several other jurisdictions, the
Illinois Supreme Court in Boyd v. Traveler's Insurance Co.,' 36 held
that a separate tort for spoliation was not necessary because a cause of
action for this type of conduct could be stated under existing Illinois
tort law. 3 7 In Boyd, the plaintiff was injured when a propane heater
13 1. See infra notes 167-87 and accompanying text.
132. Bondu v. Gurvich, 473 So.2d 1307, 1312-13 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); see
also Miller v. All State Ins. Co., 573 So. 2d 24, 27 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990)
(recognizing that a defendant's duty to preserve evidence can arise from a contract
between the defendant and the plaintiff).
133. Pirocchi v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 365 F. Supp 277, 281-82 (ED.. Pa. 1973).
134. Id. at 279.
135. See Bruzzano, supra note 1,at 133.
136. 652 N.E.2d 267 (111.1995).
137. Id. at 270. Other jurisdictions have similarly stated that a spoliation claim can
be established under common law negligence principles. See also Federated Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Precision Components, Inc., 456 N.W.2d 434, 436 (Minn. 1990); Weigl v.
Quincy Specialties Co., 601 S.2d 774, 777 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1993). In Federated Mutual,
the court did not unequivocally rule out the possibility of creating a new tort of
spoliation of evidence. 456 N.W.2d 434, at 437 (Minn. 1990). Nevertheless, the court
noted that an "action for negligent spoliation could be stated under existing negligence
law without creating a new tort." Id. at 436. The court also recognized that Minnesota
courts permit an unfavorable presumption against the spoliator of any evidence. Id. at

1997]

Spoliation of Evidence in Illinois

707

exploded at his place of employment. 38 The plaintiff filed a workers'
compensation claim against his employer and his employer's insurance
company.' 39 Employees of Traveler's Insurance took possession of
the heater to test it and eventually lost it, later admitting to the plaintiff
that they never tested the heater.,'40
The plaintiff filed suit against the manufacturer of the heater. Later,
the plaintiff joined Traveler's as a defendant and claimed that
Traveler's loss of the heater irrevocably prejudiced their products
liability action against the manufacturer.' 4' After dismissing the
spoliation of evidence claims as premature, the trial court certified the
action can be brought at the same time
question of whether a spoliation
42
as the underlying action.
While the Illinois Supreme Court refused to recognize an
independent tort of spoliation, 43 the court held that an action for
negligent spoliation of evidence can be established under existing
negligence theories. To state a negligent cause of action, the plaintiff
must plead the existence of a duty, breach of that duty, an injury
proximately caused by the breach, and resulting damages.'" The court
then stated that there is no duty to preserve evidence under Illinois
law. 14' The Boyd court, however, indicated that "a duty to preserve
evidence may arise through an agreement, a contract, a statute ... or

another special circumstance."''

46

Moreover, the court stated that "a

436-37.
138. Boyd, 652 N.E.2d at 269.
139. ld. at 269.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 269.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 269-70. The court stated that, pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court rules, it
was not necessary for it to answer the direct certified question. Id. at 270 (citing Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 366(a)(5)). The court has discretion to enter any order that "ought"
to have been given by the lower court. Id.
144. Id. at 270.
145 Id. Once again, the court addressed the issue of duty. As in any negligence
action, if the defendant owes the plaintiff no duty, there is no cause of action. See infra
note 162 and accompanying text.
146. Id. at 270-71. In California, where a spoliation tort exists, the California
courts similarly examine the duty question in this manner. These courts also look to
whether the defendant's duty to preserve the evidence originates because of a "special
relationship" or a peril created by the defendant. See Reid v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 218 Cal. Rptr. 913, 925 (Ct. App. 1985). Therefore, the difference between an
actual negligence tort of spoliation and a spoliation cause of action under general
negligence principles may simply be a matter of labeling. In addition, because Illinois
has not officially recognized a new, distinct tort, the Illinois courts can deny any
criticism that it is establishing new torts or laws in an undemocratic manner.
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defendant may voluntarily assume a duty by affirmative conduct."' 147
The court ultimately concluded that in any of the foregoing instances,
"a defendant owes a duty of due care to preserve evidence if a
reasonable person in defendant's position should have foreseen that
the evidence was material to a potential civil action." '48 The court then
held that because the Traveler's employees assumed custody of the
heater to investigate the accident, they knew
it was relevant to future
1 49
it.
preserve
to
duty
a
assumed
and
litigation
The Illinois Supreme Court set forth a requirement, similar to those
in California and Florida courts, for pleading and proving the elements
of damages. The Boyd court stated that a threat of future harm is not
actionable. 50 The plaintiff must demonstrate that the loss of evidence
caused the plaintiff to be unable to prove an otherwise valid claim. 5
In Boyd, the court held that the plaintiff satisfied this test because the
plaintiff sustained serious personal injuries, was precluded from ever
proving that the heater was defective, and alleged a nexis between
Traveler's
loss of the heater and the inability to prove the underlying
12

action.

Dissenting, Justice Heiple contended that the court was imposing
too much of a burden on the plaintiff. 5 3 Specifically, the dissent
noted the inherent difficulty facing plaintiffs to prove that they would
have succeeded in the underlying. claim.'54 Upon examining the facts,
the dissent stated that the heater could never be tested and thus there
was no way to prove that the heater was defective. 55 The dissent
argued that neither the plaintiff nor the manufacturer should be
punished for the lost evidence. 56 Rather, the dissent argued that the
only just result was to presume that the heater was defective and to
assign the burden to the most culpable party. 57 The loss should
147. Boyd, 652 N.E.2d at 271.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 272 n.1. The court recognized that the plaintiff need only prove a
"reasonable probability" that, but for defendant's loss or destruction of the evidence, the
plaintiff would have prevailed in the underlying lawsuit. Cf Smith v. Superior Court,
198 Cal. Rptr. 829, 836 (Ct. App. 1984) (stating that, in spoliation actions, the
plaintiff must allege a "reasonable probability" of the denial of a successful prosecution
or defense of a lawsuit).
151. Boyd, 652 N.E.2d at 272 n.l.
152. Id. at 271-72.
153. Id. at 274 (Heiple, J., dissenting).
154. Id (Heiple, J.; dissenting).
155. Id. (Heiple, J., dissenting).
156. Id. (Heiple, J., dissenting).
157. Id. (Heiple, J., dissenting).

Spoliation of Evidence in Illinois

19971

709

therefore be assigned to the bailee who entered the bailment with full
knowledge of the evidence and who without justification failed to
return it.158 Accordingly, the dissent concluded that it should be
presumed that the heater was defective and the case should be tried
only on the issue of damages.59
The majority reasoned that the type of evidentiary presumption
espoused by the dissent would provide too much of a windfall to the
injured party."6 Specifically, the Boyd court stated, "we can envision
several factual situations where a party has negligently lost or
destroyed evidence, but that evidence is not critical or even material to
a plaintiff's underlying case."'' 6 Second, the court declared, if
Traveler's could illustrate that the plaintiffs would have lost the
underlying claim even with the missing heater, then Traveler's had not
caused any injury; thus the plaintiff should not be allowed to recover
with an evidentiary presumption where it could be shown that the
underlying suit lacks merit. 162
With respect to the joinder issue, the court encouraged plaintiffs and
trial courts to employ joinder in these cases because a single trier of
fact was in the best position to hear and decide both cases. 63 The
court reasoned that, for instance, if the plaintiff loses the underlying
suit, only the trier of fact in that case would know the reason for the
loss.' 6 4 Thus, the trier of fact can best make a ruling on the spoliation
issues. 65 In addition, the court reasoned that joinder would preserve
valuable judicial resources.'66
D. The Problem of Duty
Most negligent spoliation causes of action are dismissed because the
defendant owed no duty to the plaintiff.167 Most courts examine
whether any "special circumstance" surrounds the spoliation act in
order to impose a duty on a party to preserve evidence. 68 These types
158. Id. (Heiple, J., dissenting).
159. Id. (Heiple, J., dissenting).
160. Id. at 273.
161.

Id.

162. Id.
163. Id. at 272.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 272.
167. See Thorne-Cook, supra note 4, at 464. See also Koplin v. Rosel Well
Perforators, Inc., 734 P.2d 1177 (Kan. 1987).
168. See Reid v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 218 Cal. Rptr. 913, 922 (Cal. Ct. App.
1985); Smith v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 829, 832-33 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984);
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of circumstances can arise from a relationship between parties,
statutes, regulations, cases, or parties' conduct.
Some commentators have theorized that criminal statutes can
constitute a source of a duty to preserve. 69 Many states have
criminalized the act of destroying evidence. 70 Several states, such as
Illinois, however, do not have a specific crime for destruction of
evidence, and thus no duty can arise from criminal statutes.' 7 1 For
other states, courts must examine whether the purpose of the statute
can be interpreted to protect civil litigants.7 2 Courts are always
reluctant to impose new duties and new causes of action based on
broadly worded criminal statutes.' 73
Another statutory source of duty are rules and regulations.' 4 For
instance, most states have rules that require hospitals to maintain
complete medical records for each patient. 75 In Illinois, these records
are to be preserved in accordance with the hospital policy announced
by the American Hospital Association. 7 6 If doctors 177 or hospitals
Miller v. All State Ins. Co., 573 So. 2d 24, 26-27 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Boyd v.
Traveler's Ins. Co., 652 N.E.2d 267, 270-71 (Il1. 1995); Koplin, 734 P.2d at 1179.
1 69. See Thorne-Cook, supra note 4, at 465.
170. See GORELICK, supra note 29, at 199-203 (providing a state by state analysis of
criminal statutes for spoliation acts).
171. Illinois' general obstruction of justice criminal statute covers the acts of
destroying evidence in pending litigation. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/31-4 (West
Supp. 1996). However, the language of the statute seems only to criminalize destruction
of evidence of a pending criminal case. Id. In contrast, many states have adopted the
model penal code. MODEL PENAL CODE § 241.7 (1980). Section 241.7 of the Model
Penal Code specifically outlaws the destruction of evidence necessary for either a
criminal or civil case. See GORELICK, supra note 29, at 191 (citing MODEL PENAL CODE §
241.7 (1980)). The Model Penal Code states: "A person commits a misdemeanor if,
believing that an official proceeding or investigation is pending or about to be
instituted, he: (1) alters, destroys, conceals or removes any record, document or thing
with purpose to impair its verity or availability in such proceeding or investigation."
MODEL PENAL CODE § 241.7.
172. See Thorne-Cook, supra note 4, at 465.
173. See Coleman v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 905 P.2d 185, 188 (N.M. 1995).
174. For instance, the Federal Department of Transportation promulgates rules that
require a truck driver and his employer to maintain records of duty status for up to seven
months. See 49 C.F.R § 395.8(k)(1). Certainly, this type of rule imposes a duty of care
on truck drivers and their employers to maintain driving records.
175. See Bondu v. Gurvich, 473 So. 2d 1307, 1309 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Fox
v. Cohen, 406 N.E.2d 178, 181 (111.App. 1st Dist. 1980).
176. Fox, 406 N.E.2d at 181-82. Pursuant to 210 ILL. COMP. STAT. 85/2 (a) of The
Hospital Licensing Act, the Illinois Department of Public Health has maintained the
same rules and regulations that require a hospital to preserve its medical records for a
period of time. 210 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 85/2(a) (West Supp. 1996).
i 77. A doctor's duty to preserve evidence would not arise under the X-ray Retention
Act because that Act only applies to hospitals. Miller v. Gupta, 672 N.E.2d 1229, 1233
(111.1996). In Miller, the appellate court, relying on Boyd v. Traveler's Ins. Co., 652
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have a duty to preserve evidence by statute, 7 8 then the duty owed is
extended to private individuals who need these records for pending
litigation.' 79
In deciding whether negligence law imposes a duty to preserve,
courts have also looked to the conduct of the spoliator or the
relationship between the spoliator and non-spoliator. The spoliator
may have promised or entered into a contract to preserve the evidence
with the injured party or a third party. 8 ' Indeed, if the spoliator
violated some contractual duty, then there may be a breach of contract
case along with a tort action. 8 ' Moreover, a California appeals court
held that the common carrier relationship between a bus driver and its
passengers imposed a duty on the bus driver82to preserve and maintain
evidentiary information after a bus accident.
Furthermore, a party may have an affirmative duty to preserve
evidence. If an individual, public agency, or company takes control
of evidence to investigate it or test it, courts will likely recognize a duty
to preserve. 83 Cases such as Boyd and Smith are clear examples. In
each of these cases, individuals took control of evidence to test it with
knowledge of both prospective litigation and the importance of the
evidence; yet they accidentally destroyed the evidence, thereby
undermining the litigation.' 84 In both cases, the Illinois and California
courts held that the spoliator's assumption of responsibility of the
evidence created a duty of ordinary care to preserve the evidence.
N.E.2d 267 (I11. 1995), permitted the plaintiff to amend her complaint to reflect a
spoliation count against the doctor defendant. Id. See supra Part IV.C for a discussion of
the Boyd decision. The defendant allegedly destroyed the plaintiff's X-rays prior to any
litigation. Miller, 672 N.E.2d at 1231. Affirming this decision, the supreme court noted
that plaintiff must allege in her amended complaint for negligent spoliation of evidence
a duty to preserve the evidence and that duty could not arise from the X-ray Retention
Act. Id. at 1233. The court further stated that under the principles of Boyd, a duty to
preserve evidence "can arise only through an agreement, a contract, a statute, or another
special circumstance, or the defendant's affirmative conduct." Id.
178. See supra notes 169-76 and accompanying text.
179. Fox, 406 N.E.2d. at 182.
180. Smith v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 829, 832-833 (Ct. App. 1984).
18 1. If an injured party fears that a third party has evidence central to its prospective
litigation, it might be advisable for them to enter into a contract to preserve. Of course,
in order to have a valid and enforceable contract, there must be consideration. Therefore,
the nature of the consideration would have to be predetermined.
182. See De Vera v. Long Beach Pub. Transp. Co., 225 Cal. Rptr. 789, 795 (Ct. App.
1986) (plaintiff recovered damages against bus company because bus driver failed to
obtain name of third-party driver following the bus accident).
183. See Smith, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 834.
184. See supra notes 96-102 and accompanying text discussing Smith; supra notes
136-166 and accompanying text discussing Boyd.
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The focus of each court on the duty issue suggests that a spoliation
tort is just another negligence cause of action. Under common law
negligence principles, courts will only impose affirmative duties if
"special circumstances" exist. For instance, the duty to rescue or help
another in distress only exists if the rescuer's affirmative conduct
caused the situation or helped to create the peril.18 5 In addition, other
affirmative duties to act and disclose are imposed pursuant to rules or
statutes. 8 6 Consequently, a duty to preserve evidence may simply be
another special or distinct affirmative duty that tort law may impose on
an individual. Indeed, many cases 8 7 in this area have held that the tort
for negligent spoliation arises not simply from the defendant's
destruction of evidence, but from additional conduct or circumstances
that mandated the establishment of a duty to preserve the evidence.
E. The Problem of Damages
1. Proving "Injury" in a Spoliation Action
In any tort action, the plaintiff must plead and prove damages. The
damages for spoliation of evidence is the inability to prove or defend a
lawsuit. Some courts have required that the plaintiff demonstrate a
"but for" test to recover. Under this approach, the plaintiff must prove
that, but for the defendant's
acts of spoliation, it would have won the
88
lawsuit.
underlying
The Boyd court, however, rejected this "but for" standard. 8 9 In
Boyd, the Illinois Supreme Court recognized that in many instances, a
plaintiff could never demonstrate that "but for" the missing evidence,
the plaintiff would have won the underlying lawsuit.' 90 Rather, the
185. See Rhodes v. 11. Cent. Gulf R.R., 665 N.E.2d 1260, 1270 (II1. 1996); see also
Steven J. Heyman, Foundations of the Duty to Rescue, 47 VAND. L. REV. 673, 675
(1994).
186. Illinois imposes a duty on a home seller to disclose a known defect or damage to
a home that may substantially impair habitability before selling it. Residential Real
Property Disclosure Act, 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 77/20 (West Supp. 1996). The
statute requires the seller to sign a statement that the home has no known defects or
impairment. 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 77/20 (West 1993). Thus, both the statute and
the seller's promise establish an affirmative duty on the seller to disclose a defect.
187 See Boyd, 652 N.E.2d at 271; Bondu, 473 So. 2d at 1312-13; Smith; 198 Cal.
Rptr. at 836; Coleman, 902 P.2d 185; Miller v. Gupta, 672 N.E.2d at 1229 (II1. 1996).
188. Jackovich v. Gen. Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 326 N.W.2d 458, 462 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1982).
189. Boyd v. Traveler's Ins. Co., 652 N.E.2d 267, 271-72 (III. 1995).
190. Id. The court stated in a footnote, however, that plaintiff need not meet this
"but for" standard, because that was "too difficult a burden, as it may be impossible to
know what the missing evidence would have shown." Id. at 271 n.2.
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court held that the plaintiff must show that but for the loss or
destruction of the evidence, the plaintiff had "a reasonable probability
of succeeding in the underlying lawsuit."''
Consequently, if the
plaintiff could not have won the underlying lawsuit, even with the lost
evidence, the defendant could not have caused any injury.1 92 This
requirement, the court reasoned, prevents a plaintiff from recovering
where it could
be shown that the underlying causes of action were
93
1
meritless.
Similarly, in Smith v. Superior Court,9 4 the court discussed the
plaintiff's difficulty in proving damages. The Smith court nevertheless
reasoned that this should not be a bar to a spoliation claim.' 95 Rather,
the plaintiff must demonstrate a reasonable probability that the lost
evidence undermined the ability to prosecute or defend the underlying
lawsuit. 196 The Smith court further pointed out that "[t]here are many
interests which the law' 97seeks to protect wherein damages cannot be
proved with certainty."'
Unlike the Boyd and Smith decisions, in Continental Insurance
Company v. Herman, 98 the Florida appeals court held that the plaintiff
had to sustain a "significant impairment" of her ability to prove the
underlying lawsuit.' 99 In Continental Insurance, the plaintiff had
already obtained an arbitration award in the underlying lawsuit despite
the act of spoliation, but then also received a high award in her
spoliation cause of action. 20 0 The court reasoned that an award of
damages prior to a spoliation action proved as a matter of law that the
plaintiff sustained no damages because of the spoliator. 20 ' No
reasonable jury therefore could hold otherwise.2 2 All courts seem to
recognize that a plaintiff faces a substantial burden to prove damages in
a spoliation action.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. 198 Cal. Rptr. 829 (Ct. App. 1986).
195. Id. at 835.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 836.
198. 576 So. 2d 313 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
199. Id. at 315.
200. Id. at 314-15.
201. Id. at 315.
202. This case also suggests that the concept of res judicta precludes the jury in a
spoliation action to reconsider already litigated claims. If the plaintiff wins an award
despite the act of spoliation, that award may conclusively establish that the plaintiff
was able to proceed with the underlying litigation. Thus, the first trier of fact determined
the issue of "injury" of the spoliation action.
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One way to help a plaintiff prove damages is the concept of joinder.
The Boyd court pointed out that the same jury should hear both the
spoliation issue and the underlying lawsuit. In this way, the jury can
adequately judge how great an effect the acts of spoliation had on the
underlying lawsuit; the jury knows first-hand what type of evidence
was destroyed. The plaintiff is then relieved from attempting to prove
uncertainty and speculation. Without one joint trial, a second trial on
the spoliation issue would simply be a repeat of the factual issues of
the first trial and an attempt to determine how much weight the jury
gave to the missing evidence in finding for the spoliator. 20 3 Most
courts would disfavor this kind of judicial inefficiency.
In addition, prior to Boyd, an Illinois court had held that a spoliation
action is not properly litigated until after a decision in the underlying
lawsuit.2°4 In that case, the plaintiff brought a negligent spoliation
claim against doctors and a hospital. She claimed that the defendants
destroyed important medical records, thereby substantially impairing
her malpractice claim.205 The court held that the plaintiff could not
prevail while the underlying medical malpractice action was still
pending because injury at this stage of the proceeding was purely
speculative. 2' The court noted that the plaintiff alleged that she would
sometime in the future lose her medical malpractice claim because of
the absence of the evidence. 207 Therefore, this spoliation lawsuit could
not be maintained on pure speculation of some future injury. 20 8 This
appellate court suggested that the plaintiff establishes no actionable
injury until she actually loses the underlying lawsuit. 209
The Illinois Supreme Court has recently noted that the only remedy
available to some non-spoliators may be the single trial on the
spoliation issue.210 In Miller v. Gupta, 1 ' the defendant's acts of
spoliation prevented the plaintiff from properly filing a medical
negligence complaint.2t 2 The supreme court thus stated that, although
203. If the plaintiff wins any award in the underlying action or a defendant
successfully defends its lawsuit, the spoliator then can possibly use this determination
against the plaintiff in a spoliation action as conclusive proof of no "injury" and no
"damages."
204. Fox v. Cohen, 406 N.E.2d 178 (111. App. Ist Dist. 1980).
205. Id. at 179.
206. Id. at 183.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Miller v. Gupta, 672 N.E.2d 1229, 1232-33 (111.1996).
211. Id.
212. Id. at 1232-33.
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the plaintiff's underlying claim was procedurally defective and
required dismissal, the plaintiff could still proceed with the spoliation
action against the same defendant. 2 3 In these circumstances-when
the underlying trial is dismissed for procedural reasons because of the
act of spoliation-only one trial will determine both the spoliation
claim and the underlying action.1 4
The concept of proving damages thus raises complicated issues. If
a plaintiff wins the underlying lawsuit, the victory could preclude her
from proving damages from spoliation and also preclude her from relitigating the issue of damages to a spoliation claim. On the issue of
the plaintiff's procedural impairment to bring a lawsuit because of the
related spoliation act, the jury may have already established that
plaintiff is entitled to some form of favorable judgment despite the act
of spoliation.215 In this situation, the plaintiffs spoliation claim is
probably moot.
Therefore, to proceed with the spoliation claim after the underlying
lawsuit, the plaintiff must lose the underlying lawsuit or establish that
the verdict is less than it would have been had the act of spoliation not
occurred. The plaintiff then has sustained a cognizable injury which
she can plead and prove. Nevertheless, if the plaintiff loses the
underlying lawsuit, it seems she cannot use this adverse judgment
against the spoliator on the issue of damages. Without a special
verdict on the spoliation issue, the jury's verdict does not necessarily
represent a factual finding on the spoliation issue. Instead, the jury
could have found against the non-spoliator simply because it did not
believe a witness. The fact-finder is not necessarily saying that the act
of spoliation caused it to find for the spoliator. Without knowing the
exact reasons for the verdict, litigants are forced to speculate as to the
effect the spoliation had on the first jury's verdict. To prevent this
bifurcated litigation and guess work as to prior fact-finder decisions,
the Boyd court articulated perhaps the most just and efficient way to
resolve a spoliation case. Under Boyd, the spoliation action and the
underlying action need to be joined so that one jury or fact-finder can
adjudicate these complex, overlapping issues.

213.
214.
215.
lawsuit
137.

Id. at 1233.
Id.
The type of judgment may be a monetary award for a plaintiff in an underlying
or a not guilty verdict in favor of the defendant. See Bruzzano, supra note 1, at
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2. Quantifying Damages
In addition, the jury may have difficulty arriving at a monetary
figure. If the destroyed evidence was not central to the issue of
damages, the jury could easily award the damages that the underlying
lawsuit would have produced but for the spoliation acts. For instance,
the jury could award an injured plaintiff the total value of the plaintiff's
injuries. In addition, where the plaintiff in the spoliation action was a
losing defendant in the underlying lawsuit, the jury could award the
spoliation plaintiff the same amount of money damages awarded to the
spoliation defendant in the underlying trial.
The more difficult question for the spoliation jury is how to quantify
the destroyed evidence that is central to the issue of damages. 1 6 One
possible solution is for the plaintiff to obtain a legal expert to establish
the value of the lawsuit. 21 7 Similar to a legal malpractice action, the
expert can tell the jury what the value of the underlying litigation
would have produced if successfully won.2"' Other possible solutions
are to give the plaintiff the maximum value of recovery based on all the
evidence before the jury, to award the plaintiff its demand, or to award
the plaintiff costs and attorneys fees because of the acts of
spoliation. 1 9 Once again, courts must produce a balanced approach
that provides the plaintiff with compensation and redress, and at the
same time, courts must make sure that this amount does not turn into
an unfair windfall.
V. CONCLUSION

Intentional and negligent spoliation torts are recent additions to
remedies available to an individual facing the loss, damage, or
destruction of crucial evidence. 220 The bringing of a spoliation lawsuit
may both adequately punish the spoliator with damages and provide
fairness to the victim. While some courts seem reluctant to recognize a
"new" tort, these same courts nevertheless permit spoliation actions to
proceed under traditional tort principles.22'
Traditional remedies addressed the problem of a party to the action
destroying, misplacing, or intentionally losing evidence.222 Courts
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

See GORELICK, supra note 29, at 167.
See Thorne-Cook, supra note 4, at 475.
Id. at 475.
See GORELICK, supra note 29, at 168.
See supra Part IV.
See supra Part IV.
See supra Part 111.
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could sanction the party through pre-trial discovery sanctions, through
jury instructions during the trial, or through lawsuit dismissal. The
spoliation tort now permits a litigant to obtain damages against a third
party spoliator.
The spoliation tort may not be a viable means for every victim of
spoliation. Some litigants may choose to rely on the traditional
discovery sanctions or jury instructions. Courts should not restrict the
type of sanction or remedy available to the non-spoliator, or make
certain sanctions exclusive depending on the type of spoliation
problem. In addition, non-spoliators should not be limited to one type
of remedy. Rather, victims of spoliation deserve the opportunity to
evaluate each remedy for its costs and benefits and decide how to
proceed. In this way, the non-spoliator has control over remedying
the vary acts of destruction that undermined or precluded its
prosecution or defense of a viable lawsuit.

